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NoTEs AND COMMENTS

In the instant case defendant's activities did not fit Into any of
the previously crystallized categories of conduct barred by the Act.
Their legality was necessarily tested by balancing their utility against
the interest of the public. The court stated no new doctrine in its conclusion that the public's interest was paramount since "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public," it having long before stated that liberty of the press is a right of the public. 14 The
weightier public interest found was therefore a legitimate one.
The decree in no sense declares the Associated Press a public
calling15 despite criticism to that effect.1 6 The confusion is due to an
unfortunate, though perhaps inevitable, use of language. For the phrase
"affected with a public interest" has been applied as a test of a public
calling, while the phrase "effect on the public" has been used as a
test of reasonableness under the Sherman Act.1 7 When the use of the
terms are considered in their contexts, the "public calling" criticism
becomes untenable. And the court legitimately "extended the law's
reach into a region where its presence had not yet been detected."18

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION
Plaintiff corporation, owner of a lake development, brought an
action to recover the unpaid balance on an installment contract for
the sale of land. Defendant alleged the contract was void and against
public policy because by its terms the purchaser is restrained from
14.

15.

16.
17.

18.

See Grossjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 234, 250 (1936).
"The predominant purpose of the grant of immunity here invoked
was to preserve an untrammelled press as a vital source of public
information."
See Associated Press v. United States, 65 Sup. Ct. 1416, 1426
(1945) (Mr. Justice Douglas concurring). "The decree which we
approve does not direct Associated Press to serve all applicants.
It goes no further than to put a ban against competitors of its
members in the same field or territory. If Associated Press,
after the effects of that discrimination have been eliminated,
freezes its membership at a given level, quite different problems
would be presented."
See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 375
(1945) (Judge Swan dissenting).
Small, "Anti-Trust Laws And Public Callings: The Associated
Press Case" (1944) 23 N. C. L. Rev. 1. "In public calling cases,
the finding of a business 'affected with a public interest' is an
inflexible condition precedent to that type of regulation. It acts
as a barrier beyond which the court cannot trespass. On the
other hand, the 'effect on the public' as spoken of in anti-trust
cases, is only a test, a method, or means to determine reasonableness and consequent validity. It is not a bar, but rather an economic weight to be measured with other elements, on the antitrust balance scale in order to arrive at the ultimate reasonable
or unreasonable nature inherent in the make-up of the combination."
Weston, supra note 12, at 60.
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making a sale or permitting its use or occupancy by any person not
a membeil of the Caucasian race; and, further, that such restraint on
general alienation is illegal and void upon constitutional grounds forbidding discrimination. Held, for the plaintiff. The provision is not
void as against public policy, nor within the constitutional prohibition
against discrimination, nor an unlawful restraint on alienation."
The United States Supreme Court in Buchanan v. Warley2 held
legislation restricting the right of a member of a particular race to
live on certain land in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, this prohibition has been construed as applying only to action by
the state and not to individual action.3 Yet in what seems to be the
earliest American case in which the constitutional problem was considered, the court in holding a covenant void said that there was no
real difference between legislative discrimination and discrimination
founded on the common law of the state:
"It would be a very narrow construction of the constitutional amendment in: question and of the decisions based upon
it, and a very restricted application of the broad principles
upon which both the amendment and the decisions proceed, to
hold that, while state and municipal legislatures are forbidden
to discriminate against Chinese in their legislation, a citizen
of the state may lawfully do so by contract, which the courts
may enforce."4
This position has received scant attention in recent years. The
courts have experienced no difficulty in finding that individual
covenants and conditions against the purchase or occupancy of property by Negroes are outside the scope of the .Fourteenth Amendment
and therefore constitutionally unobjectionable. 5 This approach has obscured the real issue that so far as these agreements operate without
state aid they are indeed purely the acts of individuals, but when the
state through one of its instrumentalities, whether it be legislative,
executive, judicial, or administrative, enforces such an agreement, state
action has occurred.6
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

, 48 A. 729 (1945).
N.J.L. Lion's Head Lake v. Brezezinski, 729 (1945).
245 U.S. 60, 81, 82 (1917); followed in Richmond v. Deans, 281
U.S. 704 (1930); Harmon, v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875).
Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181, 182 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892)
(In the latter half of its opinion, the court indicated that enforcement of the covenant would also violate the most-favored nation
clause of a treaty between the United States and China and was
contrary to public policy, as well.).
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926); Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596, 598 (1919); United
Cooperative Realty Co. v. Hawkins, 269 Ky. 563, 565, 108 S.W.
(2d) 507, 508 (1937); Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188
N.W. 330 (1932); Martin, "Segregation of Residences of Negroes"
(1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 721; Bowman, "The Constitution and
Common Law Restraints on Alienation" (1928) 8 B. U.L. Rev. 1.
McGovney, "Racial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants, or Conditions in
Deeds is Unconstitutional" (1945) 33 Calif. L. Rev. 5; Kahen,
"Validity of Anti-Negro Restrictive Covenants: A Reconsideration of the Problem" (1945) 12 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 198.
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Numerous theories have been advanced to deny enforcement to
restrictive covenants. When the purpose and the object of the restriction have been destroyed by a change of conditions within the restricted zone, the restriction ceases to be binding. if the party seeking enforcement has himself violated the restriction, enforcement has
been denied on the theory of estoppel or waiver.8 In cases of Negro
segregation by covenant or condition, the weight of authority invalidates a total restraint on alienation for an unlimited time to all
except one or more races because of a public policy which favors the
free marketability of land. 9 Covenants have been sustained where the
restraints are to particular persons or classes of persons provided
there is a reasonable time limitation, on the theory that such partial
restraints have never come within the rule prohibiting restraints upon
alienation, construing it to apply only to restraints for an unlimited
time. 10 Several courts place great emphasis upon use and uphold restraints on use and occupation as to a limited class for a reasonable
time and even in some cases for a period which is unlimited when they
will not sanction similar restraints on sale or alienation." The distinction is made on the ground that the rules against restraints on
alienations were only intended to make conveyancing free and unrestrained, and had nothing to do with use and occupancy.' 2 The chief
criticism of the rule against alienation as construed in these cases is
that it stresses the form of the restriction rather than its actual effect, which should be the determining factor.' 3
The holding in the instant case, however, is correct, since it involved an action to enforce payment and not to enforce the condition.'14
Pickel v. McCawley, 329 Mo. 166, 176, 44 S.W. (2d) 857, 861
(1931) ; Note (1940) 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 710.
8. McGovern v. Brown, 317 Ill. 73, 79, 80, 147 N.E. 664, 666 (1925)
(building restriction violated by complainant himself); Schwartz
v. Holycross, 83 Ind. App. 658, 665, 149 N.E. 699, 701 (1925)
(acquiescence in violation of building restriction).
9. Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596,
597 (1919); Porter v. Barret, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532, 535,
536 (1925); White v. White, 108 W.Va. 128, 150 S.E. 531, 539
(1929). Contra: Chandier v. Zeigler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822,
824 (1930). See Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.) pp. 25-33.
10. Queensboro Land Co. v. Cozeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641, 643
(1915) (twenty-five years); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573,
584, 585, 205 S.W. 217, 220 (1918) (twenty-five years); see Gray,
Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.) pp. 33-42.
11. Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gray, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac 596,
597 (1929); Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 302, 307, 196 At.
330, 335 (1938); Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 632, 188
N.W. 330, 332 (1922).
12. See note 11 supra.
13. Martin, "Segregation of Residences of Negroes" (1934) 32 Mich.
L. Rev. 721.
14. American Railway Express Co. v. Lindenberg, 260 U.S. 584, 590
(1923); Simpson et al. v. Fuller, 114 Ind. App. 583, 587, 51 N.E.
(2d) 870, 872 (1943) (Where the illegal can be severed from
the legal part of the contract, the bad part may be rejected and
the good retained.).
7.

